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30 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
THE TRUST RECEIPT AND THE PROBLEM
OF RECORDATION OR NOTICE FILING
HAROLD M. CARTER t
The trust receipt as a security device originated in connection
with purchases by importers from foreign manufacturers; how-
ever, it may be used as well in financing domestic transactions,1
and today it has become well entrenched in the domestic busi-
ness world of the United States. The first extensive domestic
use of this security device was by the automobile industry. 2
From the automobile industry the trust receipt has now spread
to many other articles sold to consumers on the installment
plan, such as radios, refrigerators, washing machines, etc.
Since the date in 1876 when the first case to use the term
"trust receipt" was decided,3 this security device has been a
so-called "hot potato" for the judiciary. There has been great
conflict and confusion as to what to do with the trust receipt-
whether to recognize it as a security device sui generis, or
whether to classify it as one of the existing well-entrenched
security instruments. Probably the basic reason for this con-
flict has been the secret lien aspect of the trust receipt, and
the court's reluctance to give recognition to any device which
would inflict a secret lien of any description upon the business
world and the general public. This secret lien aspect of the
trust receipt seemed to create an insurmountable obstacle in
the field of security transactions. However, beginning with
the UNIFo0=M TRUST RECEIPTS ACT of 1933 great progress has
been made to clarify the status of the trust receipt and to
overcome the conflict as to recordation or notice filing. Further
progress may be expected as a result of the work being done
on the proposed UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
t Member of the Virginia Bar.
1. In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d. Cir. 1929) ; In re A. E. Fountain,
Inc., 282 Fed 816 (2d Cir. 1922); In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co., 2 F.2d
750 (D. Del. 1924); Central Throwing Co. v. Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (3d Cir.
1912).
2. In re Boswell, 96 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1938); In re Bell Motor Co., 45
F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1930).
3. Barry vs. Boninger, 46 Md. 59 (1876).
Washington University Open Scholarship
THE TRUST RECEIPT
I. The Nature and Characteristics of the Trust Receipt
In the case of Simons v. Northeastern Finance Corp.4 it is
stated that:
'Trust Receipt' is a term applied to a written instrument
whereby a banker having advanced money for purchase of
imported merchandise and having taken title in his own
name, delivers possession to the importer on agreement in
writing to hold the merchandise in trust for the banker till
he is paid.
Since an exact definition is difficult and frequently lacks clarity,
I think an illustration will best describe this security device
which is employed in short term financing of goods which
the party financed takes for the purpose of resale, and not as
an ultimate consumer.
The definition above refers to a case of purchases by an im-
porter, but let us consider an illustration involving a domestic
use of a trust receipt. An automobile dealer wishes to pur-
chase five automobiles from the X Manufacturing Company.
The terms of the manufacturer are cash on delivery. The
dealer operates on a limited capital; therefore, he must rely
on the new automobiles as security in order to obtain a loan
to meet the purchase price. The situation is discussed with
the dealer's banker, who arranges for a credit to an amount
sufficient to cover the purchase price of the automobiles. The
order is then placed with the manufacturer, with instructions
to draw on the bank for payment and to forward the bills of
lading in the name of the bank. The manufacturer forwards
a draft with the bills of lading to the bank for acceptance.
The bank then accepts the draft. Upon payment by the bank
the manufacturer's interest in this transaction is ended and he
is entirely removed from the picture. Then a trust receipt is
drawn up whereby the bank turns over possession of the auto-
mobiles to the dealer, and whereby the dealer agrees to hold
the automobiles in trust, to sell the automobiles and turn over
the proceeds until the amount of the credit advanced by the
bank, plus interest or commissions, is satisfied.
Generally, the trust receipt contains: the name of the bank
(or financer) ; the name of the dealer; a description of the
goods; a statement that the property is held in trust, title to
4. 271 Mass. 285, 171 N.E. 643 (1930).
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remain in the bank (or financer) ; specified limitation on the
power of the dealer to use or sell the property; a direction as to
the disposition of the proceeds upon sale of the property; a
statement that the dealer is to pay all costs, attorney fees,
taxes, insurance, etc., and that the risk of loss or injury is upon
the dealer; a clause giving the bank (or financer) the right to
retake possession of the property; a statement as to reports and
accounts to be rendered to the bank (or financer) by the dealer
and the right of the bank (or financer) to examine the books
and goods. There may also be attached to the trust receipt a
time draft or a bill of sale and promissory note.
The parties in a trust receipt transaction are referred to as:
(a) the trustee-the merchant (dealer or importer) who re-
ceives credit from the bank (or financer) and gives a trust re-
ceipt for the possession of the goods; (b) the entruster-the
bank (or financer) which gives the trustee credit, receives title
to the goods, and holds the trust receipt as security; and (c) the
manufacturer (or vendor)-the party who receives the order
for the goods from the merchant (trustee), receives payment
from the bank (or financer), and turns over title, and thus the
goods, to the bank (or financer).
The nomenclature of this security device and the parties
thereto is somewhat confusing, since the terms imply a relation-
ship to the equitable law of trusts. However, there is no con-
nection whatever between the law of trust receipt and the
equitable law of trusts, except by way of analogy in certain
situations; nor does the relationship of entruster and trustee
bear any direct similarity to the equitable relationship of
trustee and cestui que trust. In a situation under the equitable
law of trusts, the legal title vests in the trustee and the equitable
title is in the cestui que trust. However, the reverse is true
in a situation under a trust receipt-the legal title vests in
the bank (or financer) for whom the property is held in "trust"
by the dealer, and the beneficial ownership is in the dealer
who gets possession by means of the trust receipt.0 The reader
5. See forms in: 1 MODERN LEGAL FORDIS § 1115-1116, and Vol. 2, § 5270-
5274; GORDON, MODERN ANNOTATED FORmS OF AGREEMENT 396 (lst ed.
1923).
6. In re Bettman-Johnson Co. 250 Fed. 657 (6th Cir. 1918); In re Dun-
lap Carpet Co., 206 Fed. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1913).
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should take precaution to distinguish between these two dis-
tinct fields of the law when thinking about the subject of this
paper.
A. Rights and Liabilities of the Entruster and the Trustee
Since the trust receipt is a contract between the entruster
and the trustee, it must conform to the laws governing contracts
or it will not be binding even as to the parties thereto.7 As in
any contractual agreement, the rights of the respective parties
are controlled by the trust receipt itself.8
At common law in those jurisdictions where the trust receipt
is recognized as a security device sui generis, the rights and
liabilities of the entruster and of the trustee are :9
The rights and liabilities of the entruster
a. To be repaid by the trustee the amount of the advance
made to the trustee plus specified interest or commission.
b. To retake the property from the trustee at any time
before or after default.
c. To sell the property, in the event of retaking, and to
apply the proceeds of the sale on the advance he made to the
trustee.
d. To recover the balance, where the entruster retakes
and sells the property for less than the amount of the ad-
vance plus the specified interest and conmission."O
e. To turn over to the trustee any balance which may re-
main over and above the amount of the advance plus interest
and commission, in the event of retaking and selling of the
property."
f. To have turned over to him by the trustee whatever
proceeds from the sale of the property may come into the
7. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Dunn Motors, Inc., 172 Ga. 400,
157 S.E. 627 (1931); P & 0 Banking Corp. v. Wurm Bros. Co., 282 Ill. App.
560 (1935).
8. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Koch, 225 Iowa 815, 281 N.W.
728 (1938); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Berry, 86 N.H. 280, 167
AtL 553 (1933); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N.C.
508, 142 S.E. 767 (1928).
9. See 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 468, 475 et seq. (1935).
10. Charavay and Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 819 (S.D.N.Y.,
1909) ; Irby v. Cage, Drew and Co., 121 La. 615, 46 So. 670 (1908).
11. In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929); T. D. Downing Co. v.
Shamut Corp., 245 Mass. 106, 139 N.E. 525 (1923).
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hands of the trustee up to the amount of the advance plus in-
terest and commission.
g. Whatever additional rights or liabilities are specified
by the trust receipt.
The rights and liabilities of the trustee
a. To terminate the interest of the entruster under the
trust receipt by repaying the advance plus interest and com-
mission.
b. To have any profits resulting from the transaction,
over and above the amount of the advance plus interest and
commission.
c. To have any balance that may remain over and above
the advance plus the specified interest and commission, in
the event the entruster retakes and sells the property. "
d. To assume any loss or injury to the property.13
e. To have any benefits from increase in market value or
accession.
f. To make up any deficiency in the event the entruster
retakes the property and sells it for less than the amount of
the advance plus interest and commission.24
g. To deal with the property only as specified in the trust
receipt.
h. To pay all costs, taxes, insurance, etc.
i. Whatever additional rights or liabilities are specified by
the trust receipt.
B. The Interest of the Entruster and the Trustee in the Property
The courts have not agreed as to the exact nature of the title
or interest in the property which is vested in the entruster or
in the trustee; however, the title of the entruster seems to be
generally recognized as a special form of security title,5 and the
interest of the trustee that of a special form of beneficial
ownership.'- In the case of General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Berry-7 it was held that the title of the entruster is not legal
12. Cases cited note 11 supra.
13. Cases cited note 11 supra.
14. Cases cited'note 10 supra.
15. In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (6th Cir. 1918).
16. Cases cited note 6 supra.
17. 86 N.H. 280, 167 AtI. 553 (1933).
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title as that word is used in its full and legal significance. The
entruster's title can be terminated by the trustee's repayment of
the advance made by the entruster to the trustee. If the trustee
sells the property, he is only accountable to the entruster for the
amount of the advance; conversely, if the entruster repossesses
and sells the property, he is accountable to the trustee for any
balance remaining over and above that owed him by the trustee.
The entruster does not share in the profits and risks of the
trustee.
In the case of In re Richheimers the court stated that the
entruster has title to the goods but only so far as is necessary to
protect his loan; that the balance of the title, the residue which
represents the excess of the goods or their value over the loan,
is in the trustee. This analysis is logical and clear if we remem-
ber that the "legal" title to the property is actually in the en-
truster until the loan is satisfied, and the title to the proceeds,
resulting from the sale of the property, over and above the
amount of the advance arises only after the amount of the ad-
vance has been repaid. However, it appears that the reasoning
of this court as to the title is likely to result in confusion and
distorted opinions. One of the requisites of a pure trust re-
ceipt is that title is at no time in the trustee; it goes directly
from the manufacturer to the entruster and remains there until
the property is sold."' In the case of In re Dunlap Carpet Co.20
the court said that the entruster takes title to the property as
soon as the goods are bought by his payments, and he continues
to hold that title as his indispensable security until the trustee
sells the goods.
I. The Need for the Trust Receipt
As stated previously, the trust receipt originated in connec-
tion with purchases by importers from foreign manufacturers.
The foreign manufacturer naturally demanded cash payments
for the goods before he would export them; otherwise, his ex-
port business would be entirely too complicated and burdensome,
especially when one of his purchasers defaulted on payment.
Therefore, in order to import goods a sizeable amount of capital
18. 221 Fed. 16 (7th Cir. 1915).
19. In re Gerstman, 157 Fed. 549 (2d Cir. 1907); Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. v. Callahan, 271 Mass. 556, 171 N.E. 820 (1930).
20. 206 Fed. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1913).
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was required. In fact, such a large amount of capital was re-
quired that unless the credit of banking capital was made
available to the importers, this trade could be carried on only
by those concerns having large capital and established foreign
credit. Today, the same is true of many situations in our domes-
tic business world. For example, the manufacturer of automo-
biles demands cash for his products. Therefore, unless the
dealers throughout the country are provided with the credit
and advances of banking and finance institutions, the automobile
dealerships can only be carried on by those of considerable
means.
What security is the importer, or dealer, of small capital able
to give to the bank (or financer) for this advance? Generally,
he does not have sufficient assets or credit upon which to rely
for such advance; therefore, he must rely upon the goods them-
selves to furnish the security required by the bank (or financer).
The importer, or dealer, must control and sell the goods be-
fore he will be able to pay the advance made to him by the bank
(or financer). Thus, we have a conflict between the necessity of
the importer, or dealer, to control and sell the goods before pay-
ment, and the demand of the bank (or financer) to assert their
claim upon the goods pending the payment of the advance.21
What security device will permit the title to the goods to
pass directly from the manufacturer to the entruster and remain
there until the goods are sold by the trustee, will reconcile the
conflicting demands of the entruster and the trustee concerning
the goods, will make repossession and sale by the entruster
quick, easy, simple and inexpensive, and will facilitate this short-
term financing transaction? A pledge is not the device, because
possession in the bank (or financer) until payment of the ad-
vance is incompatible with the necessity of the importer, or
dealer, to control and sell the goods before payment. A con-
ditional sale is not the device, because the importer, or dealer,
is not the ultimate consumer, nor is the bank (or financer) the
vendor. A chattel mortgage is not the device, because the im-
porter, or dealer, never has had title to the goods (title passes
directly from the manufacturer to the bank or financer). From
a practical business standpoint, a conditional sale or a chattel
mortgage would not be desirable in this situation, because
21. Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HAnv. L.
Rsv. 588 (1949).
Washington University Open Scholarship
THE TRUST RECEIPT
either device would complicate the procedure and be burdensome
if it became necessary for the bank (or financer) to collect the
amount advanced by retaking possession of the goods, or fore-
closing the mortgage. 2  Nor is a consignment sale the device,
because the entruster is not the original owner of the goods.
Therefore, a new security device is required to provide all of
the requisites of this transaction. That device is the trust
receipt.
III. The Disttnctions Between the Trust Receipt
and Other Security Devices
A careful analysis of the trust receipt will reveal that it
is a separate and independent security device, because the fun-
damental elements of a trust receipt are unique. In the pure
trust receipt there are three distinct parties involved-the
vendor (manufacturer), the entruster and the trustee. The
entruster is never the vendor, or the original owner of the
goods. The title passes directly from the vendor to the entruster
and remains there until the goods are sold. Title is at no
time in the trustee. This title is taken and retained by the en-
truster only to secure the payment for the goods which he
made to the vendor on behalf of the trustee. The goods are
transient and represent new merchandise to the trustee. The
trustee is never the ultimate consumer but merely takes the
goods for resale. Possession only is given to the trustee in order
that he may resell the goods.
Regardless of the distinguishing characteristics of the trust
receipt, there has been great conflict as to its true nature. For
example, the trust receipt has been classified as a conditional
sale,' 3 a chattel mortgage,2 a consignment for sale,25 a reserva-
22. C. I. T. Corp. v. Seaney, 53 Ariz. 72, 85 P.2d 713 (1939).
23. In re Collinwood Motor Sales, 72 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1934); In re
Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (6th Cir. 1918); General Motors Accep-
tance Corp. v. Whiteley, 217 Iowa 998, 252 N.W. 779 (1934) ; Ahrens Refrig-
erator Co. v. R. H. Williams Co., 176 Okla. 5, 54 P.2d 200 (1936) ; Mohr v.
First Nat'l Bank of Hanford, 69 Cal. App. 756, 232 Pac. 748 (1924); Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N.C. 508, 142 S.E. 767(1928).
24. In re Draughn and Steele Motor Co., 49 F.2d 636 (E.D. Kv. 1931) ;
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Berry 86 N.H. 280, 167 Atl. 553 (1933) ;
Smith v. Commercial Credit Corp., 113 N.J. Eq. 12, 165 Atl. 637 (1933);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 233 Ky. 290,
25 S.W.2d 405 (1930) ; Williston, Progress of the Law, 1919-1920, 34 HARv.
L. REv. 741 (1921); Frederick, Trust Receipt as Security, 22 COL. L. REv.
390 (1922).
25. Globe Securities Co. v. Gardner Motors Co., 337 Mo. 177, 85 S.W.2d
561 (1935).
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tion of title,26 a pledge,27 a bailment,28 and as a principal-
agency relationship ;29 however, many courts have held it to be a
security device sui generis.30 In the case of In re Boswel" 1 it
was stated that the trust receipt is associated with a security
instrumentality that resembles a pledge, a chattel mortgage, or
a conditional sale, that it is a transaction germane to these
instrumentalities, but which is exactly none of these media of
trade and credit.
A. The Pure Trwst Receipt
and the Bipartite Trust Receipt
In both the pure trust receipt and the so-called bipartite
trust receipt, the same three parties are involved (the vendor,
the entruster, and the trustee), and the purpose of the trans-
action is the same (to finance the trustee's purchase from the
vendor). The only distinction lies in the course of the legal
title. In the pure trust receipt the title passes directly from
the vendor to the entruster, and remains there until the goods
are sold. At no time is the title in the trustee. However, in the
bipartite trust receipt the title is at some time in the trustee.
For example, the vendor sends the bills of lading, and thus title,
directly to the trustee, then the trustee endorses the bills of
lading to the entruster, thereby passing title to the entruster.
Here as between the entruster and the trustee, the title was
originally in the trustee (thus the term "bipartite") ; whereas
26. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bettes, 57 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.
1933).
27. In re Dreuil and Co., 250 Fed. 573 (E.D. La. 1913); Canal-Commer-
cial Trust and Savings v. New Orleans, etc. R.R., 161 La. 1051, 190 So. 834
(1926) ; Hanna, TrustReceipt, 29 COL. L. Rav. 545 (1929), 19 CALiF. L. Rrv.
257 (1931).
28. In re Otto-Johnson Mercantile Co., 52 F.2d 678 (D.N.M. 1928) ; Globe
Securities Co. v. Gardner Motors Co., Inc., 337 Mo. 177, 85 S.W.2d 561
(1935); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202
N.W. 627 (1925).
29. Foreign Trade Banking Corp. v. Gerseta Corp., 237 N.Y. 265, 142
N.E. 607 (1923) ; Moors v. Wyman, 146 Mass. 60, 15 N.E. 104 (1888).
30. In re Boswell, 96 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1938); In re Bell Motor Co.,
45 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1930); In re James, 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929); In re
K. Marks and Co., 222 Fed. 52 (2d Cir. 1915); Central Throwing Co. v.
Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (3rd Cir. 1912); In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733 (2d Cir.
1910); Houch v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 44 F.2d 410 (W.D. Pa.
1930); Charavay and Bodvin v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 819 (S.D.N.Y.
1909); In re E. Reboulin Fils and Co., Inc., 165 Fed. 245 (D.N.J. 1908).
31. 20 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Calif. 1937).
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in the pure trust receipt the title was originally in a third party,
the vendor.
At common law, it was quite uniformly held that the bipartite
trust receipt was not a security transaction sui generis, but was
a chattel mortgage or a conditional sale, usually a chattel mort-
gage.312 In the case of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Com-
pany v. CallahaWi3 where title passed from the vendor to the
dealer and then from the dealer to the financer, the court held
that it was in reality a chattel mortgage, stating that the law
recognizing the validity of the trust receipt should not be ex-
tended to permit one who claims to be the owner of the goods
to borrow money on a document called a trust receipt by which
he acknowledges that he holds his own property in trust for his
creditor. The court in the case of In re A. E. Fountain, Inc.,34
stated that the holder of a trust receipt has no better standing
than the holder of an unfiled chattel mortgage, unless he derives
his security title from a person other than the one responsible
for the satisfaction of the obligation which the property secures.
B. The Trust Receipt and the Conditional Sale
The essential distinction between the trust receipt and the
conditional sale is that the entruster is not, as is the conditional
seller, the original owner of the goods; he is not the seller of the
goods; and ordinarily the entruster has the right to repossess
the goods at any time before sale (either before or after default),
whereas the conditional seller may not repossess until after
default by the purchaser.3 In the event the entruster retakes
and sells the goods for an amount in excess of the advance he
made on behalf of the trustee, this excess belongs to the trustee;
32. In re Schuttig, 1 F.2d 443 (D.N.J. 1924); In Te A. E. Fountain, Inc.,
282 Fed. 816 (2d Cir. 1922); Townsend v. Askepoo Fertilizer Co., 212 Fed.
97 (4th Cir. 1914); In re Cullen, 282 Fed. 902 (D. Md. 1922); Mason v.
Wylde, 308 Mass. 268, 32 N.E. 2d 615 (1941) ; Motor Contract Co. v. Citizens
and Southern Nat'l Bank, 66 Ga. App. 78, 17 S.E. 2d 195 (1941); McLeod
Nash Motors, Inc. v. Com'l Credit Trust, 187 Minn. 452, 246 N.W. 17 (1932) ;
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Callahan, 271 Mass. 556, 171 N.E.
820 (1930); Ohio Say. Bank and Trust Co. v. Schneider, 202 Ia. 938, 211
N.E. 248 (1926); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boddecer, 274 S.W.
1016 (Tex. 1925); Arena v. Bank of Italy, 194 Cal. 195, 228 Pac. 44;L(1924); Mohr. v. First National Bank of Hanford, 69 Cal. App. 756, 232
Pac. 748 (1924).
33. 271 Mass. 556, 171 N.E. 820 (1930).
34. 282 Fed. 816 (2d Cir. 1922).
35. In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929); In re Otto-Johnson
Mercantile Co., 52 F.2d 678 (D.N.M. 1928).
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whereas in a conditional sale the buyer is interested only in
the amount he paid on account of the conditional sale contract."0
The consideration for a trust receipt contract is the advancement
of funds by the entruster on behalf of the trustee, and not, as in
a conditional sale, the delivery of goods to the buyer. The trust
receipt may simply authorize the trustee to hold the goods for
the entruster with no obligation on the trustee to sell them. In
the event the trustee does not resell, the entruster retakes pos-
session of the unsold goods. However, the conditional sale re-
quires the buyer to pay for the goods.
C. The Trst Receipt and the Chattel Mortgage
It was stated in the case of In re Otto-Johnson Mercantile
Company37 that:
The distinction (between the trust receipt and the chattel
mortgage) is one that exists in fact-it is real and it is
clear-cut and workable. This ground of differentiation is
the fact that title does not pass to the bank from the im-
porter, but rather from a third person.
Thus, since title has never been in the importer (trustee), he
cannot convey it to the bank (entruster) in order to create a
mortgage. If the entruster's title does come from the trustee,
the trust receipt is generally held to be a chattel mortgage. 8
Another distinguishing characteristic is that of the equity
of redemption and reversion of the property. If the chattel
mortgagor conveys his title to the mortgagee as security for the
performance of an obligation of a third person, the equity of re-
demption belongs to the mortgagor, and not to the third person,
and the property reverts to the mortgagor upon performance of
the obligation by the third person. Whereas in a trust receipt
transaction, the vendor (analogous to the chattel mortgagor)
conveys his title to the entruster (analogous to the mortgagee)
as security for the performance of the obligation of the trustee
(the third person) ; any equity of redemption is in the trustee,
and under no circumstances does title revert to the vendor.'0
36. In Te James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929).
37. 52 F.2d 678 (D.N.M. 1928).
38. Cases cited note 32 supra.
39. In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929).
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D. The Trust Receipt and the Pledge
The security of a pledge depends upon possession in the
pledgee. The pledgor (debtor) transfers possession to the
pledgee (creditor). Generally, the loss of possession by the
pledgee results in the loss of the security. The title in a pledge
situation is in the pledgor, or in a third person. In a trust receipt
situation the reverse is true-the title to the property is in the
entruster (analogous to the pledgee, creditor), and the posses-
sion is in the trustee (analogous to the pledgor, debtor) .40 Origi-
nally the entruster had both title and possession to the property,
thus the trustee had nothing to transfer to the entruster as
security for his obligation.
IV. The Distinction Between the Trust Receipt and
The Principal-Agent Relationship
The entruster and the trustee under a trust receipt deal
with each other as distinct parties, and not as principal and
agent. In the principal-agent relationship, the principal enjoys
all of the benefits and suffers all of the risks connected with the
goods. Whereas, in the entruster-trustee relationship, the trus-
tee (analogous to the agent) bears all of the risks of loss and
enjoys the benefits of any profits made in connection with the
sale of the goods. If the trustee incurs liabilities to a third
person, the trustee alone is responsible therefor; the third
person cannot look to the entruster for payment, as he could
look to a principal for satisfaction for liabilities incurred by an
agent who acts within his authority.41
The entruster is not engaged in the business of dealing in
merchandise; he is a financer only. He does not participate in
the selection of the goods, nor in fixing the purchase price to
the ultimate consumer, nor in the transportation, processing, or
selling of the goods. The entruster merely advances the purchase
price at the instance of the trustee to the original vendor, on
the condition that the title to the goods shall pass directly to
the entruster and remain there as security until the amount of
40. In re James, Inc., 30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929). In Te Dunlap Carpet
Co., 206 Fed. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1913); Associates Discount Corp. v. C. E. Fay
Co., 307 Mass. 577, 30 N.E. 2d 876 (1941); Chichester v. Com'l Credit Co.,
37 Cal. App.2d. 439, 99 P.2d 1083 (1940).
41. T. D. Downing Co. v. Shawmut Corp., 245 Mass. 106, 139 N.E. 525
(1923).
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the advance plus commission or interest is paid. 2 Any further
requirements imposed upon the trustee (such as a regular, pe-
riodic accounting, or a limitation upon the manner in which the
trustee may deal with the property), are made solely for the
purpose of protecting the entruster's interest in the transaction,
and not for the purpose of engaging in the business of the trus-
tee in any manner.
V. The Recordation Requirements for the Trust Receipt
Under Local Recording Laws
As between the entruster and the trustee, the trust receipt is
valid and enforceable even without recording.43 The confusion
or conflict in the law as to the question of recordation arises
when the interests of third parties intervene. These cases may
arise in a number of different ways. The trustee may mortgage,
pledge, or assign the goods in violation of the trust receipt, or
he may become insolvent and the goods be seized by his trustee
in bankruptcy. A third party may make a loan to the trustee
relying upon the same goods as security, subsequent to the ad-
vance made by the entruster. A lien creditor may attempt to levy
execution on the goods- held by the trustee under the trust
receipt.
Since the legal effect of the trust receipt is governed by the
local laws of the jurisdiction where the transaction occurred, 44
the rights of third parties are as varied as the judicial interpre-
tation of the exact nature of the trust receipt.45 Where the trust
receipt is recognized as a security device sui generis, the title
of the entruster is held to be dominant to the claims of general
creditors, 46 and also dominant to the claim of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy where the entruster repossesses the goods in anticipation
of the insolvency of the trustee,4 7 even though the trust receipt
is not recorded under the local recording statutes. But, even
42. In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (6th Cir. 1918).
43. Habegger v. Skalla, 140 Kan. 166, 34 P.2d 113 (1934); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Berry, 86 N.H. 280, 167 Atl. 553 (1933).
44. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kline, 78 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.
1935) ; In e Collinwood Motor Sales, 72 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1934).
45. For further discussion of this point see: 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rrv. 468(1935).
46. In re Bell Motor Co., 45 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1930); In re James, Inc.,
30 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1929).
47. Houch v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 44 F.2d 410 (W.D. Pa.
1930).
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where the trust receipt is recognized as sui generis, the bona
fide purchaser in the ordinary course of business is protected
on the basis that the trustee had authority to sell and the entrus-
ter is estopped to assert his title as against the bona fide pur-
chaser.41 However, where the trust receipt is classified as one of
the other security devices, such as a chattel mortgage or a con-
ditional sale, the rights of the third person are governed by
the law of the particular device.
Before 1930 a majority of the cases held that the trust re-
ceipt was a security device sui generis, or at least not a con-
ditional sale nor a chattel mortgage, and, therefore, was valid
without recording. However, since 1930 there has been a de-
cided trend toward the prevention of secret liens, and to require
the trust receipt to be recorded on the ground that this is the
type of transaction which was intended to fall within the
recording act.4" This trend since 1930 has certainly brought
about great conflict and confusion in the law. As an example,
let us look at the various grounds upon which the courts have
held that the trust receipt comes within the recording acts.
In the case of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Seattle
Association of Credit Men"° it was not decided whether the trust
receipt was a chattel mortgage or a conditional sale, but the
court stated that secret liens whereby rights are acquired or
attempted to be acquired or retained at the expense of general
creditors are not favored in the law, and held that the trust
receipt was not sui generis, therefore it must be recorded to be
valid as to third parties. In C.I.T. Corp. v. Seaney"l it was not
decided just what kind of a security device the trust receipt
was, but it was held that the transaction resulted in the real
interest of the finance company being that of a lienholder and
thus subject to the provisions of the recording statutes. In
Motors Banker's Corp. v. C.LT. Corp.52 it was held that the
trust receipt was "in the nature of a chattel mortgage" and
48. Foreign Trading Banking Corp. v. Gerseta Corp., 237 N.Y. 265, 142
N.E. 607 (1923) ; Glass v. Continental Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921).
49. 9 U.L.A. 666 (1942); Smith v. Com'l Credit Corp., 113 N.J. Eq. 12,
165 Atl. 637 (1933).
50. 190 Wash. 284, 67 P.2d 882 (1937).
51. 53 Ariz. 72, 85 P.2d 713 (1939).
52. 258 Mich. 301, 241 N.W. 911 (1932).
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thus must be recorded. In the case of Central Acceptance
Corporation v. Lyne 53 it was stated:
In the present case we are dealing with the validity of
commercial trust receipts under the Ohio recording statutes
... . Under these statutes it is now the settled law of Ohio
that if the title conveyed to the holder of the trust receipt
is only for security for the payment of a debt, the trust
receipt must be characterized either as a chattel mortgage,
as in Thorne v. First National Bank, 37 Ohio St. 254, or as a
conditional sale as In re Bettman-Johnson Co., 23 F. (2d)
10 (C.C.A.6). . . . In either event the receipt must be filed
with the county recorder in order to prevail against the
trustee in bankruptcy.
It was held in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor
Sales Compan 54 that the Kentucky rule is that whatever may
be the name or form of a transaction, when it is designed to
hold personal property as a mere security for a debt, it is
regarded as a chattel mortgage, and thus must be recorded.
In the case of In re Draughl and Steele Motor Company", the
court stated that the Kentucky recording act applied only to
mortgages, but that a conditional sale was construed to be a
mortgage upon the ground that it is an attempt to evade the
recording statute; that to change a conditional sale into a mort-
gage calls for no greater wrench than to change a trust receipt
into a mortgage.
It is evident that the controversy over the problem of re-
cordation of the trust receipt is not new; it is a part of the
age-long conflict between the commercial interests among bor-
rowers and financers in achieving convenient, inexpensive, work-
able security devices which will adequately protect their in-
terests and the interests among the potential creditors and bona
fide purchasers in avoiding secret title reservations or secret
liens;
VI. The Need for a Uniform Act
As pointed out in previous sections, there is not only conflict
between jurisdictions as to the nature and legal effect of a trust
53. 58 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1932).
54. 233 Ky. 290, 25 S.W.2d 405 (1930); accord, Smith v. Com'l Credit
Corp., 113 N.J. Eq. 12, 165 Atl. 637 (1933).
55. 49 F.2d 636 (E.D. Ky. 1931), affirned, Commercial Inv. Trust Corp.
v. Wilson, 58 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1932).
56. Pemberton, Jr., Notice Filing for Assignments of Accounts, 13 LAw
Am CONTEmp. PROB. 643 (1948).
Washington University Open Scholarship
THE TRUST RECEIPT
receipt, but there is also conflict within certain jurisdictions.
It is difficult to ascertain the rights of the parties to a trust
receipt transaction, as well as the rights of third parties. Under
the common law, even with the exercise of precaution, rights are
frequently indefinite. For example, in the case of General Con-
tract Purchase Corp. v. Bickert"7 the trust receipt was recorded
as a conditional sale, but the court held that it was a chattel
mortgage; thus the entruster lost his rights as against the third
party. It was also pointed out previously that much of our trade
could hardly be carried on by any means other than the use of
the trust receipt; therefore, the financer's advance of money
and credit, which is the fundamental factor in the transaction,
deserves the amplest protection.
The validity of a trust receipt as a security instrument sui
generis should not turn upon the formality of the source of the
entruster's title, because the fundamental purpose of and need
for the transaction is the same whether the vendor transmits
the bills of lading directly to the entruster or whether he trans-
mits the bills of lading to the trustee who then endorses them
over to the entruster. Yet it is well established by case law
that the trust receipt cannot be extended to include the bipartite
transaction.
The solution of the problem of the trust receipt lies in a
functional approach based upon sound economic policy and
practice. There must be a balancing of the interests of the
trustee who has a dire need for trust receipt financing, of the
entruster who is reluctant to bear the burden and expense of re-
cording each transaction, of the occasional creditor who searches
the records, and of other third parties who may have claims
against the trustee. Since the courts can only choose between
the two extremes of recording or not recording, they cannot
give a satisfactory solution to the problem. A uniform act is
the only possible solution.
VII. The Uniform Trust Receipt Act
The UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT was first adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1933. The first state to adopt the Act was New York, May 12,
57. 10 N.J. Misc. 958, 161 AtI. 830 (1932).
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1934. Since that date the Act has been adopted by twenty-seven
other states.58
This Uniform Act is somewhat unique in that less emphasis
was placed upon the case law and more emphasis upon the estab-
lished business policy and practice. The purpose of the Act was
to retain the advantages of a security interest in goods by the
use of a trust receipt and yet to eliminate, as far as possible,
both secret liens and the necessity of recording each transac-
tion 5 9 It gives full protection to bona fide purchasers in the ordi-
nary course of trade and also to pledgees or mortgagees for
new value with possession, but gives the entruster preference
over general creditors of the trustee if the entruster complies
with the Act. Instead of requiring a filing or recording of each
transaction locally, the Act provides for central notice filing of
the intention to engage in a trust receipt transaction, thus it af-
fords a convenient and inexpensive method of filing and also
eliminates the necessity for a potential creditor to search a great
mass of filed or recorded papers.
The preface to the Act, which contains a statement of the
committee acting for the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, gives an excellent survey and explana-
tion of the provisions of the Act.60
VIII. The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter referred
to as the Code) was begun in January 1945, as a joint project
of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The first draft was
completed in December 1949. During the intervening period,
drafts have been considered by joint committees of the sponsor-
ing organizations and have been debated by the full membership
of each organization at annual meetings.
It had been planned to submit the Code for final approval at
the joint session of the sponsoring organizations held at Wash-
58. Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washing-
ton, Wyoming.
59. Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment Co., 385 Ill. 211, 52 N.E.2d 695(1944).
60. See appendix infra.
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ington, D. C., in May 1950; however, a resolution was adopted
instead postponing final approval until the joint session in
May 1951. This resolution stated that many suggestions and
criticisms are still being received by the editorial board from
various business association committees and affected business
groups, and that many interested groups had requested addi-
tional time for study of the Code.
The Code is a very comprehensive act covering the field of
commercial transactions in or regarding personal property, in-
cluding sales, commercial paper, foreign remittances, letters of
credit, banks deposits and collections, certain other banking
transactions, investment securities, documents of title, and
various types of financing security. Only those portions of the
Code which have some bearing upon the problem of the trust
receipt will be discussed in this paper. All references will be
to the proposed final draft, Spring 1950.
A. The Scope of Article 9 (Secured Transactions) of the Code
Article 9, entitled Secured Transactions, of the Code is a
comprehensive regulation of security interests in personal prop-
erty. Sec. 9-101 comment. It applies regardless of the form of
the transaction out of which the security interest arises, and
includes a pledge, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, conditional
sale, equipment trust, bailment lease, trust receipt, other lien
or title retention contracts and any other transaction intended
to have effect as security. Sec. 9-102 (2).
The Code supersedes not only the Uniform Trust Receipt Act
and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, but also existing state
legislation dealing with chattel mortgages, factors liens, assign-
ments of accounts receivable, inventories, and any other incon-
sistent statutes. Sec. 11-102 and comment. Since it is planned
to present the Code for adoption by the United States Congress,
it also provides a repealer section for all inconsistent Federal
Acts. Sec. 11-104. Existing security devices are not specifically
abolished by the Code, but if they are used the Code rules will
govern. Sec. 9-102 comment.
B. General Purpose and Theory of Article 9 of the Code
Article 9 of the Code is truly a functional approach to security
law. The rules are based primarily upon the fundamental pur-
pose of the security transaction and upon the type of collateral
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used as security. The complicated rules regarding the form of
a security transaction are abolished. The chief objective is to
provide full freedom of contract between the lender and the
borrower, with that freedom being restricted by the unsecured
creditor only to the extent of a method by which he may be in-
formed of the arrangement. The comment to section 9-101 states
that the aim of the article is to provide a simple and unified
structure within which the great variety of existing secured
financing transactions can go forward, with less cost and greater
certainty.
The traditional distinctions between security devices which
are based largely upon form, are abolished; the article applies to
all transactions intended to create a security interest in personal
property. The single term "security interest" is substituted for
the numerous security devices which grew up at common law
and under separate statutes. Sec. 9-101 comment. However,
all security transactions are not treated alike. Distinctions,
based upon functional differences, are made between various
types of personal property used as collateral, such as industrial
and commercial, business inventory, farm products, consumer
goods, documents of title, and where appropriate special rules
are made applicable to transactions involving each type of col-
lateral. Sec. 9-101 comment.
Article 9 is very flexible and contains simplified formalities,
thereby making it possible for new forms of security transac-
tions as they develop to fit under the Code provisions. This
avoids the necessity of passing new legislation or distorting old
statutes or security devices in order to allow new, legitimate
business transactions to go forward. Sec. 9-101 comment.
C. Article 9 of the Code and
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act
Article 9 of the Code relies very heavily upon the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act (hereafter referred to as the U.T.R.A.). The
comments to this section of the Code indicate that many of the
sections adopt the approach and follow the rules of the U.T.R.A.
With a few exceptions, the general theory of article 9 of the
Code and the U.T.R.A. are the same. However, the U.T.R.A.
did not change the existing laws of chattel mortgages and con-
ditional sales, whereas the Code repeals those laws and em-
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braces all security devices under Article 9. Under the Code a
lender who has complied with Article 9, need no longer fear
the loss of his security interest because he has called his security
instrument by one name instead of another, nor does he have to
,worry about filing under the proper statute or electing between
filing statutes as provided for under U.T.R.A. Section 16.
Article 9 of the Code not only includes the bipartite, as well
as the tripartite, trust receipt, but goes further than the
U.T.R.A. and provides that the article applies with regard to
rights, obligations and remedies of the lender, the debtor or
third parties, whether the title to the collateral is in the lender
or the debtor. Code Sec. 9-202. The Code in Section 9-107 (c)
also provides that if for the purpose of enabling the buyer
(dealer or trustee) to acquire the goods, the financer makes
advances to the buyer ten days before or after receipt of the
goods, the lender has a purchase money security in the goods,
whether or not such money was in fact used to pay for the goods.
The reason for this conclusive presumption is the difficulty of
tracing.
Code Sec. 9-307 (1) follows U.T.R.A. Sec. 9 (2) (a) in pro-
tecting a buyer in the ordinary course of trade, even though the
security interest of the lender is perfected or filed; however,
the Code section makes it clear that the rule applies even though
the buyer has actual knowledge of the security interest. This
Code section also stresses the point that not only must the buyer
be in the ordinary course of trade, but also the dealer (debtor or
trustee) must be engaged in selling goods of the description
involved.
The U.T.R.A. Sec. 11 and the Code Sec. 9-310 are similar
in that both provide for priority of specific liens arising by
virtue of a person in the ordinary course of his business furnish-
ing services or materials with respect to goods subject to a
security interest, such as services by warehousemen, carriers
and processors.
In the case of insolvency of the trustee, the U.T.R.A. Sec.
10 (b) entitles the entruster to any proceeds or the value of
any proceeds (whether such proceeds are identifiable or not)
resulting from disposition of the goods by the trustee, if such
proceeds were received by the trustee within ten days prior
to either application for appointment of a receiver, or the filing
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of a petition in bankruptcy or judical insolvency proceedings,
or demand made by the entruster for prompt accounting, and to
a priority to the amount of such proceeds or value. The Code
Sec. 9-306 (2) follows this U.T.R.A. section but it restricts the
entruster's right to the cash and checking accounts of the trustee
equal to the amount of the cash proceeds received by the trustee
within ten days prior to the institution of insolvency pro-
ceedings. This is the entruster's only right to cash proceeds
in case of insolvency of the trustee; he is not entitled to any
option or priority in any other respect.
1. Central Notice Filing Under the U.T.R.A. and
Article 9 of the Code
Those engaged in trust receipt financing strongly opposed
recordation or notice filing. The entrusters' opposition was
based upon the proposition that the trust receipt is an in-
strument well known in the field of importation and the do-
mestic automobile industry, and thus persons dealing with
importers or automobile dealers would naturally inquire as to
whether the importer or dealer was engaged in this form of
financing transaction; that the cost and burden of recording
or filing would prohibit many of these transactions; and that
since the trust receipt was generally limited to short-term
financing the accumulation of obsolete recorded trust receipts
would be tremendous. The trustees opposed recordation or notice
filing because they did not want the general public to know that
their goods were secured under a financing arrangement for fear
that it might be accepted as evidence of dire financial distress
and affect the potential customer's attitude toward their busi-
ness. Potential creditors argued that the trust receipt financing
was not restricted entirely to importers and domestic automobile
dealers; that they were entitled to be apprised of all security
interests even though they were resricted to a short term;
and that an inexpensive, convenient system of filing could
be devised which would put them on notice that a security
interest existed and yet not reveal information which might
prove detrimental to the trustee's business.
The place of filing also caused considerable controversy.
Many advocated a system of filing by counties or comparable
local units analogous to the recording required for chattel mort-
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gages and conditional sales; however, those who proposed the
central notice filing system presented a much more reasonable,
workable plan. The central filing system is more adaptable to
this type of financing transaction and reaches a more reason-
able result in balancing the interests of all parties who may
be concerned. In devising a workable system, the purpose
and function of filing must be the predominant considera-
tion. The primary purpose of filing is to give information to
those who deal with the borrower (trustee) ; therefore, the filing
must be in a place which is readily accessible to all those who
might be concerned. The system must be inexpensive, convenient,
and eliminate the burdensome job of extensive searching. It must
assure the financer that he has protected his interest; there-
fore, the filing must be in a central place, so that the financer
is not subjected to the peril of determining what law governs
the transaction, where to file his instrument, or where to search
for prior claims. It is equally important to assure others who
deal with the trustee that they may search in one central place
and find any prior claims against the trustee regardless of
where the claims are located within the state.
As a result of the U.T.R.A. and the work being done on
the Code, an excellent system of central notice filing has been
devised which very equitably balances the various arguments
concerning recordation or notice filing, the conflicting views
as to the place of filing, and the interests of all parties who are,
or may become, concerned in the financial or security transac-
tions of the borrower (trustee).
The notice filing required under the U.T.R.A. and Article 9
of the Code should not be confused with the "recordation" re-
quired by the various recording acts, although the two terms
are frequently used interchangeably. The notice filing, unlike
recordation, does not require a recording of each transaction,
but only the filing of a single, simple notice that the entruster
and trustee are engaging, or intend to engage, in a trust receipt
transaction. Section 9-403 of the Code follows the U.T.R.A. Sec-
tion 13 (1) in requiring that the notice filed is a statement,
signed by the entruster and the trustee, containing the address
of the place of business of the two parties, a statement that
the entruster is engaged, or intends to be engaged, in financing
under trust receipt transactions the acquisition of goods by
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the trustee, and a description of the kind or kinds of goods
covered or to be covered by such financing. This simple notice
requirement is based upon the theory that all that a creditor
needs to know in the first instance is that goods of a general
description are subjected to a security interest; if the creditor
wants more information this simple notice indicates where and
from whom he may obtain such additional information. This
statement is filed with the secretary of state, whereas under
the recording acts the recordation must be within the county
where the transaction occurred or where the property is located.
Centralized state fling, in lieu of the chattel mortgage and
conditional sales types of filing by counties, was adopted by
U.T.R.A. Sec. 13. The Code Sec. 9-401 follows this system of
filing, but also provides that in addition to the filing with the
secretary of state, filing is required in the county if all of the
debtor's places of business are in a single county. This portion
pertaining to additional fling in the county is within brackets
in the Code, indicating that each legislature is to determine
whether or not they wish to adopt this additional filing re-
quirement. The Code in Section 9-402 goes further than the
U.T.R.A. and covers the situation where the collateral is sub-
ject to state or federal regulation. This section provides that
a security interest in goods subject to a federal statute re-
quiring registration of or filing of the security interest or to
a statute of the state requiring registration of all liens on
certificates of title, in order to perfect the security interest
against third parties, is perfected under Article 9 of the Code
from the time of registration or filing under such statute, and
the provisions of Article 9 of the Code with regard to filing
do not apply. For example, a federal statute requires a secu-
rity interest in airplanes to be filed with the Civil Aeronautics
Administration in Washington, D. C. (49 U.S.C. Sec. 523),
and many motor vehicle statutes provide for central filing or
registration of liens on automobiles in order to perfect the
security interest.
U.T.R.A. Section 8 (1) provides that the entruster's security
interest in the goods shall without any filing be valid as against
all creditors of the trustee, with or without notice, for thirty
days after delivery of the goods. Article 9 of the Code does
not follow this U.T.R.A. rule of thirty day validity without
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filing. The Code Section 9-301 (2) provides that if a secured
lender (entruster) files before or within ten days after he
gave value, his interest takes precedence over the interest of a
transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor whose interest arises
between the time the security interest attaches and the time
time of filing. Except in Section 9-301 (2) the Code contains
no concept of relation back or grace period so as to permit
a lender or entruster to file after another interest has intervened
and thereby defeat the intervening interest. Thus another se-
cured lender, or a purchaser receiving delivery, who files within
the ten day period is entitled to protection of his interest.
Section 13 (4) of the U.T.R.A. makes the filing of a state-
ment valid for a period of one year from the date of filing and
any advances made to the trustee within that year are protected
under this filing. U.T.R.A. Section 13 (5) provides for refiling
before the expiration of the validity of the filing. This re-
filing is also valid for one year from date of refiling. The Code
Sections 9-404 and 9-405 contain improvements over the U.T.
R.A. After discharge of the obligation secured or at any time
if no advance has been made under the financing statement
previously filed, the entruster must upon a written demand from
the trustee execute and deliver a statement that the financing
arrangement has been terminated or that no lien or right exists.
Code Sec. 9-405. This prevents the possibility of the entruster
enjoying a monopoly in financing the trustee or of hamstringing
the trustee so that the trustee cannot obtain funds either from
the entruster or a third person. The Code Section 9-404 (2)
states that a financing statement is effective until a statement
of termination is delivered, as above, unless the statement
lapses as provided in Section 9-404 (3). As a substitute for
the U.T.R.A. provision of one year validity and refling to extend
the effectiveness for one year, the Code Section 9-404 (3) per-
mits a filing officer at the end of five years from the date of filing
to notify the entruster that the effectiveness of the filing will
lapse sixty days following the date of notification. If the
entruster does not fie a new statement before the expiration
of this sixty day period, the effectiveness lapses. If he does
refile the statement will be effective until a statement of termi-
nation or until this statement lapses as provided in Section
9-404 (3).
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2. The Problem of Priority Between the First to File
and the First to Advance Funds
There have been relatively few decisions under the U.T.R.A.,
but probably the most controversial case yet decided was Donn
v. Auto Dealers Investment Co.62 In that case all the trust
receipt transactions upon which both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant advanced money to the automobile dealer on the same
cars occurred after both the plaintiff and the defendant had
filed statements with the secretary of state. The plaintiff filed
on May 25, 1939, and the defendant on August 16, 1939. The
defendant was the first to advance funds to the dealer under
trust receipts. There was no evidence that either the plaintiff
or the defendant knew that the other was advancing money
to the dealer on the same automobiles. The dealer defaulted
on payment and the defendant took possession of the cars, sold
them at public sale and applied the proceeds to the debt of the
dealer. Plaintiff sued claiming priority of his trust receipt. The
court held for the defendant, stating that:
These provisions of the Act indicate that the thing which
vests in the entruster a security interest in the goods
acquired by the trustee is the trust receipt transaction and
not the filing of the statement with the Secretary of State.
The filing of such statement serves to put all contemplated
creditors on notice and defendant, when he filed his state-
ment, had constructive notice of plaintiff's filing and was
put on inquiry to learn from the trustee whether plaintiff
held security interest in the goods sought to be pledged to
him. Plaintiff by the same token, had constructive notice of
the defendant's statement when and after it was filed and
thereafter was likewise put on inquiry to learn from the
trustee whether the defendant had advanced funds and re-
ceived trust receipts on the specified goods offered to him,
the plaintiff, for a trust receipt transaction.
There is a danger under the U.T.R.A. that the entruster who
files first might enjoy a monoply on the business of the trustee,
if the first to file priority prevails. Another financer probably
would not enter into a trust receipt transaction with the trustee
if he finds on file with the secretary of state a statement of
another entruster. Also, under the U.T.R.A., an entruster may
alone file another statement with the secretary of state be-
61. 385 Ill. 215, 52 N.E.2d 695 (1944).
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fore the end of the first year, and thus continue the relation-
ship without the consent of the trustee.
The Code in Section 9-312 (1) provides that an interest at-
taching after a financing statement has been filed takes priority
from the time of its filing, and unless otherwise agreed to by
the earlier lender such priority holds also as to later advances
made by him under the statement. While providing for first
to file priority, the Code eliminates the possibility of a monopoly
by an entruster on the business of the trustee. Section 9-405 of
the Code provides a procedure whereby the trustee may termi-
nate the validity of the filed statement if the obligation se-
cured has been discharged or if no advance has been made under
the financing statement.
The Code appears to reach an equitable result. It would
seem to be an undue burden to place upon the first filing financer
to require that before he makes an advance to the trustee he
must go back to the secretary of state to see whether someone
else has gone in after him. In the Donn v. Auto Dealers In-
vestment Company case if the defendant (the second to file,
but first to advance funds) had inquired of the secretary of
state he would have discovered that the plaintiff had previously
filed a statement of intention to engage in trust receipt trans-
actions with the trustee. Then he could have ascertained
whether the plaintiff had advanced funds under the filed state-
ment. Upon discovering that no funds had been advanced by
the plaintiff, he could have refused to advance funds to the
trustee until the trustee, under the provisions of Code Sec-
tion 9-405, required the plaintiff to execute and deliver a state-
ment that the financing arrangement between the plaintiff and
the trustee had been terminated. At this point the defendant
could have filed his statement and advanced funds to the trustee
upon the assurance of his security interest being entitled to
priority. This would prevent fraudulent double financing pe-
culiar to the notice filing system.
IX. Summary
The trust receipt as a security device was originally used in
the field of importations; however, due to its peculiar adaptabil-
ity to the short term financing of dealers in such items as auto-
mobiles, radios, refrigerators, and washing machines, the de-
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vice has become well entrenched in our every day business
transactions. Since the time when the term "trust receipt"
was first used in a case of this country, there has been great
conflict as to the true nature of this security instrument and
the effect of the recordation laws upon it. A thorough under-
standing of the characteristics and purposes of the trust re-
ceipt will reveal that it is not a conditional sale, a chattel mort-
gage, or some other device, and that it should be regarded as a
security device sui generis.
Where the manufacturer demands cash for his goods, the
dealer must either have a large capital in order to obtain his
inventory, or he must have the advantages of credit and ad-
vances of banking and fincance institutions. Since only a re-
latively few dealers have the capital required, it is essential that
credit and advances be made available to dealers. Generally
the dealer who requires this credit and advance, must rely
upon the goods themselves to furnish the security required by
the financer. The dealer must control and sell the goods before
he will be able to pay the advance made to him by the financer;
at the same time the financer demands an assertion of his claim
upon the goods pending the payment of the advance. The trust
receipt is the only security device which will permit the title
to the goods to pass directly from the manufacturer to the
entruster (financer) and remain there until the goods are sold
by the trustee (dealer), and will reconcile the conflicting de-
mands of the entruster and the trustee concerning the goods.
Thus there is a dire need for the trust receipt to be recognized
as a security device sui generis.
Prior to 1930 a majority of the cases held that the trust
receipt was neither a chattel mortgage nor a conditional sale,
and was valid without recording. It was distinguished from a
chattel mortgage principally by the fact that the financer de-
rived his security title from a third party (the manufacturer
or vendor), and not from the borrower (trustee) as in a chattel
mortgage; and from a conditional sale principally by the fact
that the financer, holding a security title, was not the vendor
of the goods as in the case of a conditional sale. Since 1930,
however, there has been a decided trend toward the prevention
of secret liens, and to require the trust receipt to be recorded
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on the ground that this is the type of transaction which was in-
tended to fall within the recording acts.
The problem of whether or not a trust receipt should be
recorded should not turn upon merely formal distinctions. The
solution of the problem lies in a functional approach based upon
sound economic policy and practice. There must be a balancing
of the interests of the trustee who has a dire need for this
financing transaction, of the entruster who is reluctant to bear
the expense and burden of recording each transaction in short
term financing, the occasional creditor who searches the record,
and of other parties who may have claims against the trustee.
The courts cannot give a satisfactory solution to the problem,
because they can only choose between the two extremes of
recording or not recording; therefore a uniform act is essential.
The Uniform Trust Receipt Act adopted in 1933, and since
that date adopted by twenty-eight states, is a great step to-
ward a solution of this vital problem. The primary objective
of the Act is to reconcile the present conflict in the decisions
relating to the trust receipt, to protect the interests of third
parties who need protection from secret liens, and at the same
time to preserve the essential advantages of this security in-
strument. This Act is somewhat unique in that less emphasis was
placed upon the case law and more emphasis upon the estab-
lished business policy and practice.
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code, which is being
prepared by the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, will
probably contain a very workable solution to the problem of
the trust receipt. The Code is a comprehensive act covering
the field of commercial transactions in or regarding personal
property. Article 9 of the Code, entitled Secured Transactions,
is a comprehensive regulation of security interests in personal
property and represents a truly functional approach to security
law. This article applies regardless of the form of the trans-
action out of which the security interest arises, and includes
all transactions intended to have effect as security. The rules
are based primarily upon the fundamental purpose of the
security transaction and upon the type of collateral used as
security, and the complicated rules regarding the form of a
security transaction are abolished.
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Article 9 of the Code relies to a great extent upon the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act. With a few exceptions, the general
theory of the two are the same, and many of the sections of
Article 9 of the Code adopt the approach and follow the rules
of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. However, Article 9 of
the Code represents many improvements over the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act, as well as over the most of our existing security
law. It is very flexible and contains simplified formalities,
thereby making it possible for new forms of security trans-
actions as they develop to fit under the Code provisions. This
avoids the necessity of passing new legislation or distorting old
statutes or security devices in order to allow new, legitimate
business transactions to go forward, as has been necessary
in the case of the trust receipt during the course of the past
seventy-four years.
The trust receipt illustrates one of the numerous problems
confronting the courts and the business world because of the
inadequacy of our existing law of commercial transactions. It
also illustrates the need for every member of the legal profession
to take an active interest in the work being done on the proposed
Uniform Commercial Code, and to offer any constructive criti-
cism to the sponsoring organizations.
APPENDIX
The following excerpts were taken directly from the preface
to the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
A. Scope of the Act
"The Act regulates not only the 'orthodox' importing trust receipt trans-
action, but the analogous domestic transaction. See. 2. It also regulates--
and validates-the use of a trust receipt in favor of a pledgee where tho
pledgor-dealer happens to have already acquired title. This materially sim-
plifies business procedure by doing away with troublesome and artificial
distinctions. See. 2(1) (b); Sec. 2(1) lines 27-29; also Sec. 3.
"The Act leaves the existing law of chattel mortgages and conditional
sales unchanged, except in peculiar cases which need special coverage.
(a) Sec. 1 'Entruster,' excludes any true seller from the operation of the
Act, and limits the definition of 'Security interest,' in that Section. Thus
any true conditional sale is ouside this Act. (b) Sec. 2(3), by limiting
the purposes of a trust receipt transaction, excludes the ordinary chattel
mortgage even when made by a dealer. (c) Sec. 2(1) and Sec. 1, 'new value,'
limit the effectiveness of the transaction to the case of new acquisitions by
the dealer, as to which the new possession cannot be expected to mislead his
creditors, or to the turning back to him of security already pledged, which
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Sec. 14 limits the financer's protection to new value given as a part of the
transaction. (d) Finally, Sec. 3 makes it clear that the purposes of the Act
cannot be defeated by masking what in substance would be an unrecorded
chattel mortgage under the forms of agreement to pledge or 'equitable
pledge.'
B. General Theory of the Act
"The Act accepts the desirability of protecting the new financing of a
dealer's incoming stock ... while allowing possession to be in the dealer...
for legitimate purposes looking toward realization or substitution of the
security. This accords both with business practice and business needs.
"The Act proceeds on the theory that the entruster in such case is entitled
to protection only against honest insolvency of the trustee. Dishonest action
of the trustee is a credit risk, and bona fide purchasers are to be protected
against the entruster who has taken that risk by entrusting. (But for the
bona fide purchaser to be protected, he must be such a purchaser in 'the ordi-
nary course of business.' Sec. 9 (2) (b).
"The Act provides for a reasonable period of validity of the entruster's
security interest without filing (30 days for a trust receipt transaction.
See. 8 (1) ; 10 days for an imperfect pledge for new value. Sec. 3 (1) (a)).
The 30 day period is ample to cover any truly temporary purpose. The 10
days period fixes definitely the rights of the purported pledgee in cases of
agreements to pledge not yet perfected by taking possssion; a needed reform
-for under the present law the rights of such a 'pledgee' are wholly indefi-
nite. Perhaps even more important, the provision of the Act effectively bars
later fraudulent pretense that such an agreement 'had been made long
before,' which is one frequent way of depleting insolvent estates.
"The Act provides for a type of filing which is convenient, cheap, and
effective. The filing reveals all that a prospective creditor of the dealer
needs to know, but reveals nothing more than that. Sec. 13.62
"The Act provides for centrally accessible filing in a single office for
the entire state. This is vital to the policy of simplifying the filing provi-
sions and to making the information readily and certainly available without
expensive search. See. 13 (1).
C. What the Act Does for the Financer ar Entruster
"It frees him from the elaborate procedure necessary under the common
law to keep title from ever getting into the trustee. Sec. 2 (1).
62. Sec. 13(1) provides that: Any entrusted undertaking or contemplat-
ing trust receipt transactions with reference to documents of goods is en-
titled to file with the (Secretary of State) a statement, signed by the en-
truster and the trustee, containing:
(a) A designation of the entruster and the trustee, and of the chief
place of business of each within this state, if any; and if the entruster
has no place of business within the state, a designation of his chief place
of business outside the state; and(b) a statement that the entruster is engaged, or expects to be en-
gaged, in financing under trust receipt transactions the acquisition of
goods by the trustee; and
(c) a description of the kind or kinds of goods covered or to be covered
by such financing.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss1/6
60 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
"Where the financing extends beyond the temporary period (30 days),
it gives him convenient and workable provisions for filing and refiling.
Sec. 13.63
"It frees him from doubt and risk, where two divergent filing provisions
cover the same transaction, and allows him his due protection by compliance
with either. Sec. 16.
D. What the Act Does for the Dealer, Borrower, or Trustee
"Wherever the trust receipt has been held invalid at common law, the Act
provides for a filing which is clearly restricted to new financing, and so
protects the dealer's credit from the evil effects of having a chattel mort-
gage appear on the record against him.
"The filing required reveals nothing to the dealer's competitors of the
price paid by him for the merchandise covered by the financing. See form,
Sec. 13 (2).
E. What the Act Does for Purchaser (including Pledgees, Mortgagees and
Transferees in Bulk) from the Dealer or Trustee
"In the case of imperfect pledge, it preserves the bona fide purchaser's
common law protection. Sec. 3 (2).
"It enables warehousemen, carriers, and processors to rely on the trustee's
possession (and profession), so far as concerns specific liens for their
services. Sec. 11.
"It frees the buyer in ordinary course of trade 4 from any constructive
notice by virtue of filing. Sec. 9 (2) (a) (i).
"The Act protects a buyer in a purchase in due course on credit against
the antiquated equity doctrine that a price as yet unpaid is not 'value.' This
permits normal business to go on, merely substituting the entruster (after
due notice) as the purchaser's creditor. See. 9 (3).
"But a purchaser not in ordinary course of trade is affected by filing.
See. 9 (2) (b). That subsection comes to this:
(i) A bona fide pledgee or mortgagee for new value takes free of the
entruster's interest, even within the temporary period, if he also
obtains possession. (cf. Sales Act, Sec. 25.)
(ii) Not so a pledgee or mortgagee for old value, or a transferee in bulk.
63. Sec. 13(1) supra note 60; Sec. 13(5) provides: At any time before
expiration of the validity of the filing... a like statement or an affidavit
by the entruster alone, setting out the information required by subsection 1,
may be filed in like manner as the original filing. Any filing of such
further statement or affidavit shall be valid in like manner and for like
period as an original filing, and shall also continue the rank of the en-
truster's existing security interest as against all junior interests.
64. See. 1, "Buyer in the ordinary course of trade" means a person to
whom goods are sold and delivered for new value and who acts in good faith
and without actual knowledge of any limitation on the trustee's liberty of
sale, including one who takes by conditional sale or under a pre-existing
mercantile contract with the trustee to buy the goods delivered, or like
goods, for cash or on credit. "Buyer in the ordinary course of trade" does
not include a pledgee, a mortgagee, a lienor, or a transferee in bulk.
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(iii) After the temporary period, and before filing, any pledgee, mort-
gagee or transferee in bulk, even for old value, takes free of the
entruster's interest if he obtains delivery.
(iv) After filing, no pledgee, mortgagee or transferee in bulk can take
free of the entruster's interest. The reason is clear: All of these
are persons whose business it is to look up the status of any trustee
with whom they are dealing.
"Even when a purchaser has notice, the entruster's rights are limited
to the new value given by him in connection with the transaction, or to the
interest he previously held. Sec. 14.
F. What the Act Does for Creditors
(Lien Creditors and General Creditors) of the Trustee
"In the case of agreement to pledge not perfected by possession, the Act
limits the validity of the 'pledgee's' interest against all creditors to 10 days,
even where new value has been given by the purported pledge. Sec. 3
(1) (a).
"In such case, where the purported pledge is for old value, the effect
against creditors dates only as the time of possession actually taken. Sec.
3 (1) (b). These two provisions, taken together, effectually exclude the use
of pretended (or unperformed) prior agreements to pledge, dated back more
than 4 months, from draining an insolvent estate in favor of particular
selected creditors.
"Belated filing is also prevented from defeating general creditor's rights
by relation back, See. 7 (1) (b) ; as is the taking of possession under an
unfled trust receipt transaction. Sec. 7(2).
"It limits any rights the entruster acquires without filing to a 30 day
period. Sec. 8(1) and (2). It will be noted here that 'lien creditor' as used
in Sec. 8(2) covers, under clause (b) of that subsection, the representatives
of general creditors, whenever insolvency supervenes.
"It permits any individual creditor, after the temporary period and before
filing, to acquire a lien prevailing over that of the entruster by securing
the issuance of process thereafter duly served. Sec. 8 (9) (a). It will thus
no longer be possible to defeat the levying creditor by giving notice as the
sheriff arrives.
"It deprives the entruster of the altogether improper possibility of acting
like a mere creditor while things go well, but insisting on his rights as an
entruster if things go badly."
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